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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______
No. 11-1749
_____________
RICARDO THOMAS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
______
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew R. Arthur
(No. A031-406-238)
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 6, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 7, 2012)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Ricardo Thomas (“Thomas”) seeks our review of an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for cancellation of removal.
Thomas concedes that he is removable because of a controlled substance conviction, but

he denies that he is removable because of an aggravated felony conviction. When he was
before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas contested the aggravated felony charge and
sought cancellation of removal. For the reasons that follow, we deny Thomas’s petition
for review.
I.
Thomas, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a
Lawful Permanent Resident on January 20, 1971. On January 30, 2009, he pleaded guilty
to manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance
in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30) in the Court of Common Pleas of
Bucks County. 1 During Thomas’s guilty plea, the prosecuting attorney introduced the
matter and requested amendments to the criminal information. At this point, the judge
asked “[w]hat happened?” The prosecuting attorney replied that police executed a search
warrant on Thomas’s residence and seized “103 live marijuana plants in various stages of
development” and “11 cut marijuana plants.” The judge asked whether there were “[a]ny
questions about the facts.” Thomas’s attorney replied “[n]o questions.” The court then
stated “[a]nd it does seem to me that that provides an ample factual basis” to accept
Thomas’s guilty plea.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Thomas with a Notice to
Appear in Immigration Court on June 15, 2010. The Notice charged that he was
removable from the United States on two grounds: (1) conviction for an aggravated
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On August 10, 2009, Thomas was sentenced to eleven-and-half to twenty-three months
of incarceration, and two years of probation.
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felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (2) conviction relating to a
controlled substance violation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I).
In front of the IJ, Thomas conceded the charge of removability pursuant to the
controlled substance violation. He denied, however, the charge of removability pursuant
to an aggravated felony conviction and filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated felony
charge. He also filed an application for cancellation of removal. DHS filed a motion to
pretermit Thomas’s application for cancellation of removal, arguing that he was
convicted of an aggravated felony. DHS also submitted evidence to document the
convictions. The most pertinent piece of evidence for this appeal was the transcript of the
plea colloquy described above.
The IJ granted DHS’s motion to pretermit. The IJ held that Thomas assented to
the prosecutor’s statements during his guilty plea regarding the number of marijuana
plants, or alternatively, that even if Thomas did not assent to the facts, the plea colloquy
transcript was sufficient to conclude that the facts formed the basis of Thomas’s
conviction. 2
Thomas contended that he qualified for the “small amount of marihuana”
exception set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4). The evidence of the number of plants
during the plea colloquy was instrumental to the IJ’s determination that Thomas
possessed more than a “small amount of marihuana.” Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D)
2

The IJ also made determinations regarding (1) whether he could rely on the criminal
complaint that had been superseded by a criminal information in determining whether the
conviction was an aggravated felony, and (2) whether Thomas’s conviction satisfied the
illicit trafficking approach. The IJ’s rulings on these issues are not challenged by the
parties on appeal, and for that reason we need not examine them.
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and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4), manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, fifty kilograms or less of marijuana is a
class D felony. An exception applies to offenses involving “50 or more marihuana
plants,” which makes such a case a class C felony. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) & (D); 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3).
Since Congress mandated offenses involving more than 50 plants be punished
with a higher sentence, the IJ determined, based on the plea colloquy, that Thomas could
not qualify as having a “small amount.” As a result, regardless of whether Thomas was
convicted of “manufacturing” or “distributing” marijuana under Pennsylvania law, he
would not qualify for the “small amount” exception set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4).
Because Thomas could not qualify for this exception, the IJ concluded his conviction was
an aggravated felony under the hypothetical federal felony test, and, as a result, an
aggravated felony that rendered him both removable from the United States and ineligible
for cancellation of removal. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, and
Thomas petitioned for our review.
II.
We have jurisdiction over the final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). We exercise plenary review over Thomas’s argument that he was not convicted
of an aggravated felony. Jeune v. Attorney Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007).
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts and affirms the decision of the IJ, as well as provides its
own reasoning for its decision, the Court reviews both the decisions of the IJ and the
BIA.” Hashmi v. Attorney Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).
4

III.
Before turning to the legal issues concerning Thomas’s state court conviction, we
must first address the Attorney General’s argument regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We lack jurisdiction to review arguments made for the first
time on appeal for which there is no record to review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Xie v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 245 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004). The Attorney General is correct in his
assertion that Thomas failed to present two arguments he now advances in his petition for
review. These arguments—that Pennsylvania’s definition of marijuana is narrower than
the federal definition of marijuana, and that the plea colloquy does not establish whether
the seized plants can be classified as marijuana under this narrower definition—are
consequently ones over which we have no jurisdiction to review.
We now turn to Thomas’s state court conviction. “8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)
requires that the Government prove removability by clear and convincing evidence.”
Evanson v. Attorney Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 293 n.8 (3d Cir. 2008)
An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony is not eligible for certain
types of relief set forth in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Relevant to this case,
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is not eligible for cancellation of removal. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3) & (b)(1)(C). In drug-related cases such as this, the INA defines
“aggravated felony” as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section
802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title
18).” Id. at § 1101(a)(43)(B). The term “aggravated felony” applies to offenses
committed “in violation of Federal or State law.” Id. at § 1101(a)(43).
5

This Court has “held that there are two routes by which a[] [state] offense may
qualify as an aggravated felony.” Jeune, 476 F.3d at 201. These are the illicit trafficking
and the hypothetical federal felony routes. The illicit trafficking approach classifies a
state conviction as an aggravated felony if the conviction “is a felony under state law and
contains a ‘trafficking element.’” Id. Under the hypothetical federal felony approach,
“the state conviction is an aggravated felony if it would qualify as a felony under the
Federal Controlled Substances Act.” Id. Because the IJ ruled in favor of Thomas
regarding the illicit trafficking route, and ruled against him regarding the hypothetical
federal felony route, the issue in this case is whether Thomas’s state conviction qualifies
as a hypothetical federal felony.
A.
In order to determine what records we may consider in deciding whether a
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, this Court applies either the “formal
categorical approach” or the “modified categorical approach.” 3 The modified categorical
approach “is used when the state statute is divisible.” Catwell v. Attorney Gen., 623 F.3d
199, 207 (3d Cir. 2010). We have previously held that 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780113(a)(30) is divisible and subject to the modified categorical approach. Catwell, 623
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), set forth
both the formal categorical approach and, what we have called the “modified categorical
approach,” in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act. This Court has applied this
framework to determining whether a conviction is an “aggravated felony” as defined in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Taylor’s
analysis can be readily imported here, because 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is similar to 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) in that it too enumerates offenses, conviction of which places an alien in
the category of ‘aggravated felon.’”).
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F.3d at 207; Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293 n.9. Therefore, we can consider the records of the
state court proceeding “to determine the factual basis of the conviction.” Catwell, 623
F.3d at 207. The issue before us in this case is whether “the factual basis of the
conviction” includes the transcript of the plea colloquy given the statements it contains.
We believe the transcript of Thomas’s plea colloquy is part of the “factual basis of
the conviction” and that it was proper for the IJ and BIA to consider it in reaching their
decisions. In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), the Supreme Court extended
the modified categorical approach to cases resolved by guilty plea. The Court held that,
among other evidence, a reviewing court may consider the “transcript of plea colloquy.”
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17. The Court made clear that the focus must be on whether the
“plea had ‘necessarily’ rested on” the elements of the predicate offense. Id. at 20–21.
The record in the case before us is different from that in Thomas v. Attorney Gen.,
625 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010). The record in that prior case did not definitively establish a
factual basis for the plea. We stated that, “[o]rdinarily, the factual basis for the plea
appears in the record of conviction, and a court applying the modified categorical
approach should be able to discern which of the alternative elements a defendant
‘necessarily admitted’ during a guilty plea colloquy.” Thomas, 625 F.3d at 146–47
(citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.). But in Thomas the factual basis for both pleas was not
clear. There was “no documentation relative” to the first plea. Id. at 147. Regarding the
second plea, the transcript showed that he “admitt[ed] nothing during” the colloquy, since
his counsel simply informed the sentencing court that he was pleading guilty to the crime
“in full satisfaction.” Id. There was no reference to a police offer’s written statement,
7

“nor [was] there any inquiry by the presiding judge during the guilty plea, as to Thomas’s
specific conduct.” Id. Because the transcripts provided no factual basis for the pleas, we
held the transcripts could not be considered as evidence that Thomas admitted or assented
to the facts set forth elsewhere in the record.
The plea colloquy in this case provides better evidence of the “factual basis of the
conviction.” Unlike the presiding judge in Thomas, the state judge here asked about the
specific conduct underlying the charges. The state judge accepted Thomas’s plea and
stated that the prosecutor’s statements concerning the 103 live, and 11 cut, marijuana
plants found in Thomas’s home “provide[] an ample factual basis” for accepting the
guilty plea. Whereas in Thomas it was not clear that the plea “necessarily rested on”
certain facts since the facts were not set forth during the plea colloquy and the state judge
did not inquire as to them, here the state judge made clear that the plea rested upon the
facts set forth by the prosecuting attorney.
Accordingly, we believe that the IJ and BIA appropriately considered the
transcript in conducting its hypothetical federal felony analysis. Further, the transcript of
the guilty plea in this case is itself sufficient for the Attorney General to prove
removability by clear and convincing evidence, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
See Catwell, 623 F.3d at 203, 208 (holding criminal information provided satisfactory
basis for Attorney General to prove an aggravated felony conviction).
Having decided what evidence we may consider, we must now determine if
Thomas’s state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the hypothetical
federal felony approach. In cases where the state conviction relates to marijuana, the
8

conviction is “only equivalent to a federal drug felony if the offense involved payment or
more than a small amount of marijuana.” Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289. “The federal
Controlled Substances Act makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally ‘manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense’”
marijuana. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)). However, “distributing a small amount of
marihuana for no remuneration” is a misdemeanor. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4)).
Thomas cannot qualify for the “small amount” exception because of the number of
marijuana plants he pleaded guilty to manufacturing/distributing. The authorities seized
over 100 marijuana plants from his residence. As described above, more than 50
marijuana plants turns a class D felony into a class C felony under 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(C) and (D).
We believe the IJ properly reasoned that, by mandating a higher sentence in cases
involving 50 or more marijuana plants, Congress did not consider this number of plants
to qualify as a “small amount” that would lead to a lower sentence under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(4). Further, as we have previously stated, “Congress contemplated and intended
‘small amount’ to mean the amount of marijuana an individual would be likely to use on
a single occasion, in a social setting.” Catwell, 623 F.3d at 209. Possessing over 100
marijuana plants does not fall within the parameters we set forth. Id. (stating that a small
amount “would be no more than one or two marijuana cigarettes, or a few grams of
marijuana”).
As a result, the IJ properly determined that Thomas’s conviction would have been
punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and, accordingly, it is an aggravated felony
9

under the hypothetical federal felony test. Because Thomas’s conviction satisfies the
hypothetical federal felony test, he is removable as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This renders Thomas ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8
U.S.C § 1229b(a)(3).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Thomas’s petition for review.
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